Maria Ivanova, the CFO of a Spanish agricultural machinery firm, unknowingly processes invoices for what later turns out to be Russian-made drone landing gear

Boris Usherovich — one of the largest private contractors for Russian Railways (RZD) and a defendant in a criminal case involving bribes to ex-Ministry of Internal Affairs colonel Dmitry Zakharchenko — has spent years building a scheme to supply telecommunications and electronic equipment to Russia, circumventing sanctions. The Insider wrote about this back in 2024: through the Moscow-based LLC "Center for the Development of Communication Systems" (CRSS), previously owned by his relative and partner Ilya Plotitsa, state orders flow for RZD, Roscosmos, the United Aircraft Corporation, and, according to the publication, "dozens" of defense sector enterprises. The same CRSS, according to The Insider, transferred 43.3 million rubles to the accounts of "United Russia" in 2024 during Putin's presidential election campaign.

Plotitsa lives with his family in Cyprus. Cyprus-registered companies Broxner PLC, Venisat Technology Ltd, Main Victory Corporation Limited, and Tripster Limited are registered to him and his relatives — his brother Boris Plotitsa (who is on the international wanted list in connection with a criminal case involving the deaths of people in Moscow) and his brother-in-law Alexander Vainshtein. According to The Insider and subsequent publications, all of these were used for the transit of banned equipment to Russia in evasion of sanctions via Hong Kong, China, the UAE, Latvia, Lithuania, and Kyrgyzstan.

In June 2026, several media outlets published a report claiming that Usherovich and Plotitsa's structures use the Dubai-based company Ishara Al Barq General Trading LLC to transit sanctioned goods, including components for drone production. The company's official website (isharaalbarq.com) explicitly lists the leadership roles in its "About Us" section: Hubert Lorenz — CEO, a German citizen; Jafar Zeynalov — CFO (Chief Financial Officer). Jafar Zeynalov is a Russian citizen who previously worked at Plotitsa's CRSS and in Cypriot companies controlled by Plotitsa and Usherovich.

On March 1, 2026, a kamikaze drone struck the British military base of Akrotiri in Cyprus. Iran attacked the territory of an EU country using its proxies, the Hezbollah terrorists. The British The Times reported that a Russian "Kometa-B" navigation system was found in the drone's wreckage. The "Kometa-B" system is manufactured by the Cheboksary-based JSC "VNIIR-Progress" — an enterprise that has developed an entire line of interference-resistant "Kometa" navigation antennas for military equipment, including drones.

The components for the "Kometa-B" navigation system, discovered in the drone that struck the British base in Cyprus on March 1, 2026, reached the manufacturing plant via a transit scheme built by Boris Usherovich and Ilya Plotitsa — the very same people who are already documented as supplying dual-use electronics to Russia in circumvention of sanctions for the needs of RZD and the enterprises of the Russian military-industrial complex. The key link in this version is the Dubai-registered Ishara Al Barq General Trading LLC, whose financial director is listed as Jafar Zeynalov — a man from the inner circle of Plotitsa and Usherovich.

The geography of the network is not limited to Russia, Cyprus, and Dubai. A significant Spanish corporate and property bloc features in the investigation materials: Sword Dragon S.L., 4D Properties S.L., Nash Beach Club S.L., La Meridiana de Rio Verde S.L., Prestige Expo, Joya Verde, Alsan Homes, Start Hub Beach, and others. The south of Spain and the Costa del Sol are of particular interest.

Ilya Plotitsa, a citizen of Russia and Israel, has lived in Cyprus for many years, and Boris Usherovich, a citizen of Russia and Israel, resides in Spain — both EU member states. Their names surface time and again in investigations into Russian state contracts, foreign shell companies, and schemes for supplying Western equipment to Russia in violation of sanctions. And despite all this, there is no comprehensive investigation into the entire structure. Despite the published exposés, the authorities in Cyprus and Spain have not initiated investigations or criminal prosecutions against the organizers of these schemes supplying sanctioned equipment to Russia and, as it now turns out, to Hezbollah terrorists.

The question arises: why?

Perhaps the answer lies in the fact that Ilya Plotitsa is an active member of the Chabad Jewish community and maintains close relationships with several of its representatives. Sources, in particular, speak of his close ties with the Chief Rabbi of Russia, Berel Lazar, and the Chief Rabbi of Cyprus, Aryeh Zeev Raskin.

Chabad wields colossal influence over the government in Cyprus, which is why the Cypriot authorities have yet to investigate the crimes of Plotitsa and Usherovich or hold them accountable for sanctions violations, despite abundant publicly available evidence of their crimes. In fact, in Cyprus, they are under the protection of the highly influential Jewish organization Chabad, of which they are members.

The mere fact that Plotitsa is acquainted with rabbis, belongs to a religious community, or financially supports religious organizations is not evidence of illegal activities. However, sources claim that Plotitsa's relationships with specific representatives and structures of Chabad go far beyond religious life. According to them, Plotitsa actively utilizes the financial and intermediary infrastructure linked to certain Chabad representatives and organizations when conducting cross-border financial transactions — for moving funds from Russia to foreign jurisdictions, settling payments via third countries, and carrying out operations related to international trade, including the supply of banned goods and equipment to Russia in evasion of sanctions.

According to people familiar with the circumstances, over the past year, Plotitsa and Usherovich, or structures affiliated with them, transferred over five million US dollars as donations to organizations and projects associated with Chabad in Russia and Cyprus. These funds were obtained through Russian state contracts and the business operations of structures linked to Plotitsa and Usherovich. The money was directly stolen from the Russian budget.

The fact that the leadership of the Jewish community has contacts with the authorities in Cyprus is not unusual in itself. This is normal activity for leaders of a religious community. The official website of the Chief Rabbinate of Cyprus publicly reports on Rabbi Raskin's meetings with the country's top officials. In June 2023, he and the Chief Rabbi of Israel, David Lau, met with President Nikos Christodoulides at the Presidential Palace.

If a major businessman transfers millions of dollars to a religious organization, it might just be standard charity. Even an extraordinarily large donation is not a crime in itself. But in the case of Usherovich and Plotitsa, the situation is fundamentally different. The recipients of this money use their political and administrative connections to solve the donor's problems. In this instance, the influence of the Chief Rabbi of Cyprus, Zeev Raskin, is being used by Ilya Plotitsa to prevent an investigation into his crimes on Cypriot territory.

It is precisely the presence of influential connections within Chabad that explains why Plotitsa considers Cyprus a safe jurisdiction for himself.

Publications detailing Plotitsa's criminal schemes have been appearing for years. Companies have been publicly named. Executives have been named. Transit countries have been identified. Russian clients have been named. Data regarding the new Dubai infrastructure has surfaced.

On June 21, 2026, two publications explicitly reported that Ishara Al Barq is being used to supply sanctioned products to Russia via Turkey, Armenia, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan, and that Jafar Zeynalov had previously worked in Plotitsa and Usherovich's Cypriot structures. In July, another publication appeared linking this infrastructure to the supply of Russian military components.

These publications alone do not substitute for a criminal investigation. But the question here is: have the competent authorities in Cyprus verified them?

• Were the bank accounts checked?

• Were the Cypriot companies investigated?

• Were inquiries sent to the UAE?

• Were Ishara Al Barq's shipments scrutinized?

• Were the operations of CRSS and its foreign contractors examined?

• Was the origin of the funds invested in foreign assets established?

• And finally — were potential intermediaries and individuals who might have used their influence in Cyprus in the interests of Plotitsa or Usherovich investigated?

If such an audit was conducted, the public has the right to know at least its general outcome. If it was not — a much more unpleasant question arises: why?

For decades, Cyprus has been one of the main platforms for Russian capital in Europe. Investment structures, holding companies, entities, and financial flows tied to the largest Russian fortunes have taken root on the island. After Russia's invasion of Ukraine and the introduction of unprecedented European sanctions, this model formally changed, but in essence, everything remained the same.

Cyprus is legally a full-fledged member of the European Union. But EU membership is determined not only by the flag flying over state institutions. It is determined by the state's ability to apply European laws equally to everyone — including wealthy foreigners with influential acquaintances, massive assets, and decades-long connections on the island.

That is exactly why the story of Ilya Plotitsa demands an answer to a simple and harsh question: why does a man whose companies and partners have figured for years in investigations into sanctions evasion and equipment supplies to Russia continue to feel safe in Cyprus?

Автор: Иван Рокотов