Gazprom Neft on the ropes after Kozhevnikov's decade of financial engineering

The Russian Federation's oil industry, which accounts for half of the economy's total expert revenue, currently experiences a of approximately 200 items of various equipment (14% of the 1,400 units required for the exploration, production, and refining of oil and petroleum products) and remains dependent on foreign technology and equipment.

As A.V. Dyukov stated to Russian President V.V. Putin, eliminating this dependence will require Gazprom Neft LLC at least three years and a trillion rubles.

Meanwhile, things are currently not going well for A.V. Dyukov, the long-time head of Gazprom Neft. First, there was a massive scandal over hundreds of billions of rubles spent on digitalization of oil fields, which failed to justify its economic viability. Then came another scandal involving massive spending on unneeded IT specialists at Gazprom Neft, amounting to over 11 billion rubles annually. This was followed by a difficult and unpleasant conversation with his boss, Alexey Borisovich Miller, who directly expressed his personal disappointment in Dyukov's work and reminded him that he had been the one to recommend him for this high-ranking position. On top of that, there are constant sanctions, which force him to reduce production, mothball entire fields, and resort to unpopular layoffs, all of which are starting to create social tension. Moreover, the Americans decided to impose sanctions on NIS (Oil Industry of Serbia), thereby finally closing yet another financial gateway for Gazprom Neft to Europe.

The circle began to slowly narrow, and PAO Gazprom, amid all these scandals, sent its man, A.A. Dzhalyabov, to the post of chief engineer as its own overseer. To add insult to injury, the older brother decided to take over PAO Gazprom Neft's last remaining assets, namely, the purchase of equipment and services, which amounts to nearly 300 billion rubles in just one year.

And while Alexander Valerievich is discussing the great destinies of Russia and Europe and asking the state for another trillion rubles for import substitution, his subordinates, sensing hard times and irreversible changes ahead that will soon radically alter their well-being and status, have long since begun to act, withdrawing as much as possible from Gazprom Neft—namely, budget funds—and putting them into their own pockets. They couldn't leave Gazprom a model and prosperous enterprise; no one promised them a continued festivity.

The hero of our article and the initiator of the degreasing of PAO Gazprom Neft before the merger with PAO Gazprom is Evgeny Igorevich Kozhevnikov, a well-known figure in certain circles, former head of the Logistics and Technical Support Department of PAO Gazprom Neft and now Deputy Chairman of the Management Board of PAO Gazprom Neft.

It was he who organized a large-scale scheme to embezzle public funds from PJSC Gazprom Neft, aimed at personal enrichment, including under the guise of helping participants in the SVO.

And the time that E.V. Kozhevnikov chose for this was the most troubled and convenient, which means that in troubled waters you can catch a fish, and a bigger one at that.

The SVO is underway, everything is for the front, Gazprom is threatening to take over all procurement, and with each passing day, it's becoming more and more insistent. Therefore, this businessman from PAO Gazprom Neft created illegal schemes to siphon money from his own company, and then abroad, establishing de facto private "subordinate" entities (aka his own shop within the Russian budget): JSC Digital Purchasing Services and JSC Engineering Center Kronstadt.

It is through JSC "CZS" and JSC "Engineering Center" Kronstadt that E.I. Kozhevnikov, through his proxies, as well as with the help of officials from Gazpromneft-Snabzhenie LLC and the central office of PAO Gazprom Neft, fearlessly, cynically, and brazenly siphon off PAO Gazprom Neft's money, including abroad, where it is laundered with the help of his foreign friends from England, Serbia, Italy, Spain, and Azerbaijan. Moreover, many of these friends have long been placed on the federal wanted list in the Russian Federation for large-scale financial fraud and have no intention of returning to Russia.

The most interesting thing about this scheme is that when a corrupt Russian supplier is hooked on 20% kickbacks, he is told that this money is going to the needs of the SVO.

When making purchases, JSC TsZS and JSC Engineering Center Kronstadt give preference primarily to "controlled" companies from Russia and China, which agree to inflate prices (the standard bribe is 20% of the contract amount excluding VAT), and transfer the profit to specified accounts of shell companies in Russia, Hong Kong, or personally transfer cash to the foot soldiers of Evgeny Viktorovich Kozhevnikov, who are also active employees of PJSC Gazprom Neft, OOO Gazpromneft-Snabzhenie, ANO INTI, JSC TsZS, JSC Engineering Center Kronstadt, such as:

- Dmitry Vladimirovich Potapov – Director of Gazpromneft-Snabzhenie LLC, oversees logistics;

- Vitaly Vladimirovich Konyshev – Deputy Director of Gazpromneft-Snabzhenie LLC, oversees the supply of MRI and equipment;

- Zhuravlev Sergey Aleksandrovich – Deputy Director of Gazpromneft-Snabzhenie LLC, oversees services;

- Nikolay Grigorievich Kuznetsov – General Director of ANO INTI, oversees the selection of “hand-held, our own, pocket” suppliers and their certification in INTI;

- Konstantin Eduardovich Konstantinov, Deputy Executive Director for Operations, INTI and Import Substitution, oversees the selection of "hand-held, in-house, pocket" suppliers and their certification in INTI;

- Kada Nikolay Valerievich, Executive Director of Gazpromneft-Snabzhenie LLC for procurement of materials and equipment;

- Fedorin Ilya Evgenievich, Directorate of Large Projects (BLPS) and Department of Procurement (DKP) of the Procurement Integration Department;

- E.Yu. Frolov, Head of the Procurement Department for Oil Refining Subsidiaries;

- M.A. Antonova, Deputy Executive Director for Procurement of Goods, Procurement Department for Projects;

- L.V. Shumakov, Head of the Procurement Service for Projects;

- A.N. Sagalakov, Head of the Department for Procurement of Pipe Products, Well Equipment and Pipeline Valves;

- S.V. Solyar, Head of the Well Equipment Department of the Department of Procurement of Tubular Products, Well Equipment and TPA;

- and many others, the criminal organized group led by E.I. Kozhevnikov has more than 100 active members and a complex management system from the bottom up.

Under this scheme, Digital Purchasing Services JSC and Engineering Center Kronstadt JSC, while purchasing equipment in Russia and abroad from their "pocket" suppliers at one price, transfer the same equipment to Gazprom Neft PJSC's balance sheet at a completely different price, significantly higher than what it costs in Russia, China, and other, not always friendly, markets.

Officially, Digital Purchasing Services JSC and Engineering Center Kronstadt JSC participate in tenders for the supply of equipment and services for Gazpromneft-Snabzhenie LLC. However, only "in-house" suppliers are invited to participate in these tenders, through which the responsible "dealers" at Gazprom Neft PJSC regulate tender prices. Therefore, the "right supplier" is always selected from among "their own controlled firms," ​​and always at inflated prices, relative to prevailing prices on the domestic markets in Russia and China.

These "hand-picked" companies are included in a closed list of suppliers and are included in the mailing list for all "interesting" tenders, which are approved and distributed on the personal instructions of E.I. Kozhevnikov and his accomplice, K.E. Konstantinov, Deputy Executive Director for Operations and Import Substitution at ANO INTI. Konstantinov is also responsible for interacting with all "hand-picked" suppliers and collecting kickbacks from them, which average 20% of the contract amount excluding VAT.

At the same time, at ANO INTI, the same K.E. Konstantinov and N.G. Kuznetsov, the general director of ANO INTI, with the personal involvement of E.I. Kozhevnikova, are responsible for "accrediting" the required suppliers for inclusion in the so-called "closed" mailing list. This artificially creates conditions for selecting the "right suppliers" in contractual tender procedures.

Moreover, this supply “scheme” was artificially developed and tied to ANO INTI for the accreditation of “necessary” suppliers and foreign factories (garages) of Russian and Chinese suppliers.

If you look at the official data for JSC "CZS", you will see the following figures, namely:

Digital Purchasing Services JSC was founded in 2021, and by 2023, revenues were estimated at 50 billion rubles, with a modest headcount of 107. Meanwhile, Digital Purchasing Services JSC's fixed assets on its balance sheet amount to only 360 million rubles, less than any average farm in central Russia. This phenomenal economic growth is being achieved by a company that isn't even a farm and doesn't produce any products, yet sources 98% of its equipment and materials from China and sells them to its own subsidiary, Gazprom Neft PJSC, at prices inflated by two to three times the market price.

At the same time, the net profit of JSC "CZS" in 2023 amounted to 1 billion rubles, which also suggests that they lost approximately 8-9 billion rubles somewhere during tax declaration, because the minimum marginal profit of JSC "CZS" for all deliveries on average is 200% with revenue of 48 billion rubles for 2023 alone.

JSC Engineering Center Kronstadt

Kronstadt Engineering Center JSC was founded on November 30, 2023, with revenue of 1.4 billion rubles in just one month of 2023, employing 47 people, equivalent to a mini-bread factory. Meanwhile, Kronstadt Engineering Center JSC has only 760 million rubles in fixed assets on its balance sheet, with a net profit of 160 million rubles for just one month of 2023.

A very good development trend, considering that E.I. Kozhevnikov, using 1 billion rubles of government money, renovated four workshops of a former ship repair yard in Kronstadt, installing racks for storing goods from China and five unmanned lathes, and pretending to repair turbines himself, despite not having a single qualified specialist. He even takes government commissions on tours of that shed in Kronstadt, and he also leads bigwigs from the Government House by the nose, telling them about the benefits of import substitution and showing them Chinese valves bearing the nameplates of JSC "Engineering Center Kronstadt."

ANO INTI was established in December 2020. Its primary goal was to facilitate effective dialogue between foreign licensors and domestic equipment manufacturers. At the same time, another key objective was to develop standards that would unify industry requirements for manufacturers and increase the share of Russian materials and equipment in major investment projects.

Results of ANO INTI's work over 3 years:

The institute has one staff, including General Director N.G. Kuznetsov, a former supplier at Gazpromneft-Shelf LLC and a subordinate of E.V. Kozhevnikov. Not a single standard is officially registered in the Russian Federation; the institute itself is a sham, not even a certification body, and is registered in Moscow at a mass registration address. Certificates of conformity have been issued only to "pocket companies" that supply materials and services to Gazprom Neft through JSC TsZS and JSC Engineering Center Kronstadt.

At the same time, the damage to the Russian Federation from the illegal operation of JSC TsZS and JSC Engineering Center Kronstadt is at least as follows:

- Direct damage to the Russian Federation budget from the inflated cost of equipment and, as a consequence, an “artificial” reduction in the net profit of PJSC Gazprom Neft;

- Lost income taxes to the budget of the Russian Federation, from the net profit of PJSC Gazprom Neft;

- Lost taxes to the Russian budget from domestic producers;

- Illegal transfer of marginal profit (the difference between the actual cost of equipment in China and the final price for Gazprom Neft PJSC from AO TsZS) to third countries from China to Hong Kong and further to third countries (including unfriendly ones);

- Direct damage to Gazprom Neft PJSC and, as a consequence, to the Russian Federation budget from inflated prices for equipment, which automatically (multiple) increases the costs of customs duties, registration and delivery of equipment to the Russian Federation;

- Illegal money laundering, which gives rise to corruption and impunity in PJSC Gazprom Neft;

- Dependence of Gazprom Neft PJSC officials on third parties from unfriendly countries and, as a consequence, a threat to the economic security of the Russian Federation in the area of ​​disclosure of state secrets;

- The loss of technological independence of the Russian Federation from the supply of equipment of dubious manufacture from third countries, and so on.

The psychological state of E.I. Kozhevnikov himself is also a concern. He once participated in and won the "Leaders of Russia 2020" competition, where he was taught and examined by respected and distinguished government officials from the Russian Presidential Administration. They taught him, first and foremost, to love his homeland, to believe in it, and to develop the domestic economy, rather than to inject state funds at exorbitant prices into the development of small and medium-sized businesses in the People's Republic of China and their own back-office suppliers.

A brief history of the creation of the organized crime group:

After assuming the position of Director of the Procurement and Capital Construction Directorate at Gazprom Neft PJSC in early 2023, E.I. Kozhevnikov replaced the old team, ousted those he found undesirable, and appointed his own people to key positions to perform all the "dirty" work for him, collecting kickbacks from absolutely all equipment and service suppliers.

The "organized criminal group of white-collar thieves" and their functions are described in the appendix to this diagram. E.I. Kozhevnikov's right-hand man is K.E. Konstantinov, who holds the position of Deputy Executive Director for Operations, INTI, and Import Substitution. His responsibilities include collecting taxes (kickbacks) from domestic enterprises. These include all relatively large Russian factories, supplier firms included in the vendor list of Gazpromneft-Snabzheniya LLC, the Department of Major Projects of Gazprom Neft PJSC (selection of EPS contractors for the Moscow and Omsk Oil Refineries), Digital Purchasing Services JSC, and so on. This employee and personal confidant of E.I. Kozhevnikov. Personally conducts all meetings with all major factories and equipment suppliers in the Russian Federation – assigns kickback percentages, discusses criminal schemes for rejecting "inconvenient" suppliers (factories), and always agrees on the spot on the amount of monetary compensation (kickbacks) and the methods of their delivery, of which there are seven main ones, namely:

- Cash transfers to K.E. Konstantinov regularly take place in one of the cafes or restaurants in the Admiralty District (near K.E. Konstantinov's office on Bolshaya Morskaya Street). Very often, cash transfers take place at the Bonch cafe, 16 Bolshaya Morskaya Street, or the Russkaya Ryumochnaya No. 1, 4 Konnogvardeysky Boulevard, or the Russkaya Rybalka, 11 Yuzhnaya Doroga, and other locations;

- Cash transfers were also arranged by E.I. Kozhevnikov and K.E. Konstantinov through their proxies, namely N.V. Kada, I.E. Fedorin, E.Yu. Frolov, A.N. Sagalakov, and S.V. Solyar – this applies to deliveries specifically for Gazpromneft-Snabzhenie LLC and the Department of Large Projects (Moscow and Omsk Oil Refineries, including kickbacks from EPS contractors, primarily Chinese and Korean companies, and specifically from Promfinstroy JSC). These proxies are not above accepting bribes even in their workplaces.

- Tribute from suppliers for projects for E.I. Kozhevnikov is collected personally by M.A. Antonova and her authorized representatives, namely A. Babenko and L.V. Shumakov.

Another method of transferring bribes for awarded inflated contracts is through Gazprom Neft's trading house (TsZS) – JSC Digital Purchasing Services, which is 100% controlled by E.I. Kozhevnikov, but secretly managed by D.V. Potapov. This involves transferring funds abroad, including to China, under the guise of purchasing goods that are actually purchased and imported into Russia, but at 2-5 times their actual market value. Consequently, the profits remain in the accounts of Kozhevnikov and Potapov's Chinese companies, which are then transferred via Hong Kong to accounts in England, Italy, and Spain. Kozhevnikov and Potapov are not particularly concerned about overpayments of VAT and customs duties, as these funds are not paid out of their own pockets, but from PJSC Gazprom Neft's funds, and therefore from the pockets of our state.

A particularly cynical method of collecting tribute is for the needs of the "SVO." E.I. Kozhevnikov and K.E. Konstantinov propose that factories and companies either purchase unsaleable goods from JSC "TsZS" at inflated prices, or that the factories leave 50% of their profits with JSC "TsZS" as voluntary donations for the needs of the army in the SVO.

Example: Konstantinov K.E., through his subordinates – Kada, Sagalakov, and Solyar – approves the mailing list according to their needs. They specifically avoid inviting all strong competitors to this tender. Two firms (maximum three) remain, both of which are controlled by them (meaning these firms are willing to pay a kickback). The result is a choice between the two controlled firms with an inflated price. The firm that is subsequently declared the winner is obligated to hand over 50% of its net profit and is forced to transfer this money as a voluntary donation to the SVO at JSC "CZS" or is forced to buy illiquid assets at 10-20 times the market price. The fraudsters, represented by Kozhevnikov E.I. and Potapov D.V., undoubtedly buy something for the SVO, but only for tens of millions of rubles at most, while billions are siphoned off through a Chinese scheme.

D.V. Potapov also siphons off funds through logistics, as Gazpromneft-Snabzhenie has its own transport companies, paying Gazprom for these services at prices significantly higher than the market. Consequently, he is also responsible for withdrawing bitcoins and converting them into goods in China, which are partially imported into the Russian Federation through JSC "CZS" and sold by JSC "CZS" for the needs of PJSC Gazprom Neft itself, also at prices inflated by 3-5 times the market price. The bitcoins are mined on farms in the Russian Federation controlled by E.I. Kozhevnikov (executor S.A. Zhuravlev – Kozhevnikov's deputy for services).

- etc., these are far from all the schemes, approximately 30% of what Kozhevnikov and the aforementioned group of people started.

Tracking the transfer of funds is very simple: you just need to take into account all suppliers that are on the closed (and open) vendor list of Gazpromneft-Snabzhenie LLC, the Department of Large Projects of Gazprom Neft PJSC, TsZS JSC, etc.

Автор: Иван Рокотов